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Abstract. The Legendre PRF relies on the conjectured pseudorandom-
ness properties of the Legendre symbol with a hidden shift. Originally
proposed as a PRG by Damg˚ard at CRYPTO 1988, it was recently
suggested as an efficient PRF for multiparty computation purposes by
Grassi et al. at CCS 2016. Moreover, the Legendre PRF is being consid-
ered for usage in the Ethereum 2.0 blockchain.
This paper improves previous attacks on the Legendre PRF and its
higher-degree variant due to Khovratovich by reducing the time com-
plexity from O(p log p/M) to O(p log2 p/M2) Legendre symbol evalua-
tions when M ≤ 4√p queries are available. The practical relevance of our
improved attack is demonstrated by breaking two concrete instances of
the PRF proposed by the Ethereum foundation. Furthermore, we gen-
eralize our attack in a nontrivial way to the higher-degree variant of
the Legendre PRF and we point out a large class of weak keys for this
construction.
Lastly, we provide the first security analysis of two additional generaliza-
tions of the Legendre PRF originally proposed by Damg˚ard in the PRG
setting, namely the Jacobi PRF and the power residue PRF.
1 Introduction
The Legendre symbol is a multiplicative function modulo an odd prime number
p that assigns to an element a ∈ Fp the value 1, 0 or −1 depending on whether
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or not a is a square. Specifically,
(
a
p
)
=

1 if a = b2 for some b ∈ F×p ,
0 if a = 0 ,
−1 otherwise .
The distribution of Legendre symbols has been a subject of study for number
theorists at least since the early 1900s [Ala96, vS98, Jac06, Dav31, Dav39]. In
particular, it follows from the Weil bound [Wei48] that the number of occurrences
of a fixed pattern of l nonzero Legendre symbols among the integers 1, 2, . . . , p−1
modulo p is
p
2l
+O(√p) ,
as p→∞. In other words, the distribution of fixed length substrings of Legendre
symbols converges to the uniform distribution.
In 1988, Damg˚ard [Dam90] conjectured pseudorandom properties of the sequence(
k
p
)
,
(
k + 1
p
)
,
(
k + 2
p
)
, . . . ,
where k has been sampled from Fp uniformly at random. He proposed to use
this construction as a pseudorandom number generator. More recently, Grassi et
al. [GRR+16] have proposed the same construction as a candidate pseudoran-
dom function and have shown that it can be evaluated very efficiently in the
secure multiparty computation setting. Concretely, the Legendre pseudorandom
function Lk(x) is defined by mapping the Legendre symbol with a secret shift k
to {0, 1}:
Lk(x) =
⌊
1
2
(
1−
(
k + x
p
))⌋
,
where p is a public prime number.
Damg˚ard’s work additionally considers several generalizations of the Legendre
PRG that could be more efficient and/or more secure. One of these is to replace
the Legendre symbols above by Jacobi symbols. In this case, the public modulus
n is taken to be a product
∏
i pi of odd primes. Recall that the Jacobi symbol
of a ∈ Fp is defined as (a
n
)
=
∏
i
( a
pi
)
.
Damg˚ard argues that Jacobi symbols are more secure by showing that the Ja-
cobi generator is strongly unpredictable if the Legendre generator is weakly un-
predictable. Further, he notes that calculating Jacobi symbols is more efficient
because computing them reduces to computing Legendre symbols modulo each
of the smaller prime factors. A second generalization proposed by Damg˚ard is
the use of higher power residue symbols instead of quadratic residue symbols.
Concretely, for a prime p with p ≡ 1 mod r, he proposes to use the r-th power
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residue symbol a 7→ a(p−1)/r mod p. This potentially increases the throughput
of the PRF, because we now obtain log2 r bits of output per PRF call rather
than a single bit.
Very recently, the Legendre PRF was proposed to be used in the Ethereum
2.0 proof-of-custody mechanism [Fei19b]. In this context, several cryptanalysis
bounties were announced by the Ethereum foundation during the CRYPTO
2019 rump session [Fei19a]. Among the proposed challenges, there are concrete
instances of the Legendre PRF with expected security levels ranging from 44 to
128 bits of security. For each instance, 220 sequential output bits are given and
the goal is to recover the secret key.
Despite the longevity of Damg˚ard’s pseudorandomness conjecture and the re-
cent surge of application-oriented interest in the Legendre PRF, relatively few
cryptanalytic results are available. It is known that, given quantum query access
to Lk, the key k can be recovered with a single query to Lk and in quantum
polynomial time [vDH00]. No subexponential attacks are known in the classical
setting or the setting where a quantum adversary is only allowed to query Lk
classically.
The best cryptanalytic results in the classical setting are due to Khovratovich
[Kho19], who gives a memoryless birthday-bound attack. His attack recovers the
key with a computational cost of O(√p log p) Legendre symbol evaluations when
given
√
p log p queries to Lk. Khovratovich also considers a higher-degree variant
of the Legendre PRF, where the output is computed as the Legendre symbol of a
secret polynomial in the input. Similar to the Jacobi symbol generalization, the
higher-degree Legendre PRF potentially offers security and efficiency benefits.
Contributions. This paper aims to advance the state-of-the-art in the crypt-
analysis of the Legendre PRF by improving upon Khovratovich’s attacks on the
one hand, and by providing the first security analysis of the Jacobi and power
residue symbol generalizations on the other hand. Table 1 provides a summary
of our main results. The practical relevance of our attacks is demonstrated by
our solution of the first two concrete Legendre PRF challenges proposed by the
Ethereum foundation [Fei19b]. These were expected to correspond to a security
level of 44 and 54 bits, but our attacks imply that the actual security levels for
these challenges are significantly lower.
After introducing the necessary preliminaries in Section 2, we show how the
Khovratovich attack can be significantly improved in the low-data setting. In
particular, for M ≤ 4√p queries, the attack in Section 3 of this paper recovers
the key with a time-complexity of O(p log2 p/M2) Legendre symbol evaluations
and a memory cost of O(M2). In Section 4, the attack from Section 3 is general-
ized to the higher-degree case. As before, this amounts to a significant improve-
ment in the low-data setting. In addition, for d ≥ 3 and with M = p queries,
we gain a factor of p in time-complexity compared to Khovratovich’s results.
Furthermore, in Section 4, a large class of weak keys for the higher-degree Leg-
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endre PRF is shown to exist. For keys in this class, key-recovery requires roughly
O(pbd/2cd log p) Legendre symbol evaluations with only ddlog pe queries to the
PRF. This attack requires O(pdd/2ed log p) memory, but trade-offs are available
using Van Oorschot-Wiener golden collision search. We also give a reduction to
the unique k-XOR problem, which results in further time-memory trade-offs.
The first of Damg˚ard’s generalizations is discussed in Section 6. Specifically, it
will be shown that the Jacobi PRF can be broken with cost proportional to the
cost of breaking the Legendre PRF for each of the prime factors of the modulus
separately. The power residue symbol generalization is analyzed in Section 7.
Besides the straightforward generalization of the attack from Section 3 to the
r-th power residue symbol PRF, we additionally provide a more efficient attack
for the case where r is large.
Finally, concrete implementation results are provided in Section 8. We report on
the specific amount of time and memory that was necessary to solve the first two
Legendre PRF challenges of the Ethereum foundation. These results showcase
the practical relevance of our attacks.
Table 1. Query, time and memory requirements of previous and new attacks on the
Legendre PRF. The reported time and memory values are asymptotic upper bounds
(O-notation), ` and s denote the time-complexity of computing a Legendre and power
residue symbol respectively. The attack strategy for composite moduli from Section 6
can be combined with any of the attacks in this table.
Reference Queries Time Memory
Legendre PRF
Randomized [Kho19] log p `p log p log p
Khovratovich [Kho19]
√
p log p `
√
p log p log p
Section 3.1 M M + `p log p/M M log p
Section 3.3 M M2 + `p log2 p/M2 M2
Section 3.4 M M2 + p log2 p/M2 M2/ log p
Degree d ≥ 2
Legendre PRF
Randomized [Kho19] log p `pd d log p d log p
Khovratovich [Kho19] p `pd−1d log p d log p
Section 4 M M2 + `pdd2 log2 p/M2 M2
Section 5 d log p `pbd/2cd log p pdd/2ed log p
r-th power-
residue PRF
Section 7.2 M M2 + sp log2 p/(M2 log2 r) M2 log r
Section 7.3 M M + sp log2 p/(Mr log2 r) M log r
2 Preliminaries
After introducing the Legendre PRF and some related notation in Section 2.1,
Section 2.2 recalls how Legendre and power residue symbols can be computed
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efficiently. Finally, Sections 2.3 and 2.4 discuss Khovratovich’s attacks on the
Legendre PRF and its higher degree variant.
2.1 Legendre PRF
Definition 1 (Legendre function). For a given odd prime p, we consider the
function
l : Fp → F2
x 7→
⌊
1
2
(
1−
(
x
p
))⌋
which maps quadratic residues modulo p to 0 ∈ F2 and quadratic non-residues
to 1 ∈ F2.
Definition 2 (Legendre PRF). Let p be an odd prime and d a positive integer.
The degree d-Legendre PRF over Fp is a family of functions Lk : Fp → F2 such
that for each k ∈ Fdp,
Lk(x) = l
(
xd +
∑d−1
i=0 ki+1 x
i
)
.
Remark 1. For any given field Fp, the Legendre symbol is multiplicative, i.e.(
ab
p
)
=
(
a
p
)(
b
p
)
for all a, b ∈ Fp.
In terms of the Legendre function l, multiplication of inputs corresponds to
addition in F2 of the respective images. Indeed
l(ab) = l(a)⊕ l(b) for all a, b ∈ F×p ,
where ⊕ denotes addition in F2.
In our analysis, we will often consider sequential evaluations of a given degree
d Legendre PRF Lk starting from a point a with an additive or multiplicative
step b. We call such vectors L-sequences.
Definition 3 (L-sequences). Let p be an odd prime, m a positive integer and
a, b ∈ Fp. For a given Lk over Fp, we define the arithmetic L-sequence of length
m with starting point a and stride b as the Fm2 -vector
Lk(a+ b [m]) := (Lk(a), Lk(a+ b), . . . , Lk(a+ (m− 1)b) ).
Similarly, we define the geometric L-sequence of length m with starting point a
and common ratio b as the Fm2 -vector
Lk(a · b[m]) := (Lk(a), Lk(a · b), . . . , Lk(a · bm−1 )).
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To justify the correctness of our attack, the following property of Lk will be
assumed.
Assumption 1 Let p be an odd prime and d a positive integer. Let m = ddlog pe.
For all k ∈ Fdp, there exist at most O(1) keys k′ ∈ Fdp such that Lk′([m]) =
Lk([m]).
2.2 Evaluating Legendre and Power Residue Symbols
Using the law of quadratic reciprocity, i.e. for odd coprime integers p and q(
p
q
)(
q
p
)
= (−1) p−12 q−12 ,
Legendre symbols (and more generally Jacobi symbols) can be computed at es-
sentially the same cost as a GCD computation. Using the Euclidean algorithm,
the cost of a Legendre symbol computation is O(log p) arithmetic operations, or
O(log2 p log log p) bit operations. Brent and Zimmerman [BZ10] give an asymp-
totically better algorithm with complexityO(log p log2 log p). Power residue sym-
bols can be computed via modular exponentiation in timeO(log p log(p/r) log log p).
In the remainder of this paper, we will often refer to the cost of an algorithm in
terms of the number of Legendre symbol computations or power residue symbol
computations.
2.3 Attacks on the Linear Legendre PRF
Khovratovich [Kho19] describes a chosen plaintext attack for the linear Legendre
PRF Lk that recovers k ∈ Fp with O(√p log p) queries to Lk. The attack is based
on a memoryless collision search between two specific functions and can be briefly
summarized as follows.
Let m = dlog pe and consider the functions x 7→ Lk(x+[m]) and x 7→ L0(x+[m]).
Note that the L-sequence Lk(x+[m]) is available by querying the Legendre PRF,
whereas L0(x+[m]) does not depend on k. By Assumption 1, a collision between
x 7→ Lk(x + [m]) and x 7→ L0(x + [m]) yields k with high probability. Indeed,
let a, b ∈ Fp be such that Lk(a+ [m]) = L0(b+ [m]). We have
L0(a+ k + [m]) = L0(b+ [m]).
In accordance with Assumption 1, the number of superfluous candidates for k
satisfying the above equality is expected to be at most O(1).
Collisions between x 7→ Lk(x + [m]) and x 7→ L0(x + [m]) can be found with a
generic memoryless collision search method [MOM92] in O(√p) evaluations of
both functions. Since computing each L-sequence requires m = O(log p) calls to
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Lk, the overall complexity sums up to O(√p log p) queries to Lk and L0. More
generally, if only M queries to Lk are allowed, a collision can be found with
O(p log2 p/M) queries to L0. This will be discussed in detail in Section 3.1.
We note that Khovratovich’s original attack builds sequences of length m using
arbitrary evaluations of the Legendre function Lk rather than consecutive ones.
This difference does not affect the overall attack complexity, but by using L-
sequences we will be able to reduce the data complexity in Section 3.
2.4 Attacks on the Higher-Degree Legendre PRF
Khovratovich [Kho19] also presents a generalization of the chosen plaintext at-
tack from Section 2.3 to the quadratic case and, ultimately, to arbitrary degrees.
Let k = (k1, k2) ∈ F2p and consider the associated quadratic Legendre PRF Lk.
Choose any r ∈ F×p . From the multiplicative property of the Legendre symbol
we get that for any a ∈ Fp and j ∈ Z,
L(r2j k1,rj k2)(a) = l(r
2j)⊕ L(k1,k2)(ar−j) = Lk(ar−j), 3
since r2j is clearly a quadratic residue modulo p. Let m = 2dlog pe. If we find a
k′ ∈ F2p and a j ∈ Z such that
Lk′(r · r[m]) = Lk(r1−j · r[m]),
then we successfully recover k by letting k1 = k
′
1r
−2j and k2 = k′2r
−j . As for the
linear case, such a collision can be found memorylessly with O(p) queries to Lk
and O(p) Legendre symbol computations.
For the general case, consider the degree-d Legendre PRF Lk. Similarly to the
quadratic case, we have for each a ∈ Fp and j ∈ Z that
Lk1rdj ,k2r(d−1)j ,...,kdrj (a) = l(r
dj)⊕ Lk(ar−j).
By guessing the coefficients k3, . . . , kd, it is possible to attack the remaining
coefficients k1 and k2 using geometric L-sequences of length ddlog pe similar to
the quadratic case. It follows that k can be recovered using O(pd−2 ·p ·d log p) =
O(pd−1d log p) Legendre symbol evaluations, given O(p) queries to Lk.
3 Improved Attack on the Linear Legendre PRF
In this section, we show how Khovratovich’s attack (Section 2.3) on the Legendre
PRF can be improved when the total number of available queries is less than
3 This equation, and many other equations in this paper, only holds if none of the
involved Legendre symbols evaluate to zero. Since this does not pose a problem in
practice we choose to ignore this issue for notational convenience.
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√
p. Although, in its simplest form, our method requires additional memory,
we discuss several techniques to reduce memory requirements while keeping the
same overall time complexity.
3.1 Table-Based Collision Search
We first transform the attack by Khovratovich into a table-based collision search.
LetM be the allowed number of queries to the oracle Lk, where log pM < √p.
Let m = dlog pe and let M˜ = M −m+ 1. The attack proceeds as follows:
1. Store in a table T the pairs (Lk(a+ [m]), a) for all a ∈
{
0, . . . , M˜ − 1
}
.
2. Sample b uniformly at random from Fp until (L0(b + [m]), a) ∈ T for some
a ∈ {0, . . . , M˜−1}. For each a corresponding to such a collision, a candidate
key k˜ is recovered as k˜ = b− a. By Assumption 1, the number of candidate
keys is at most O(1). Candidate keys k˜ can be tested by comparing one
or more entries of T with the corresponding arithmetic L-sequences with
starting point k˜.
Regarding the time and memory complexity of this attack, we note that the first
step requires M queries to Lk, from which we obtain M˜ arithmetic L-sequences
that are stored using O(M log p) memory. The second step requires O(p log p/M)
evaluations of the Legendre symbol and no additional memory is needed. Hence,
the overall computational cost of the attack is O(M + p log p/M).
Note that this variant of the attack already reduces the query and time com-
plexities by a log p factor compared to the memoryless collision search, although
a significant amount of memory is employed.
Remark 2. The above attack can be made deterministic by choosing b ∈ {0, . . . , bp/M˜c}
and considering the sequences v = L0(bM˜+[m]) in the second step of the attack.
Indeed, it is easy to see that for any k ∈ Fp, the arithmetic L-sequence at offset
M˜
⌈
k/M˜
⌉
will be computed in both steps of the attack and the correct key is
guaranteed to be recovered after at most O(M + p log p/M) Legendre symbol
evaluations.
3.2 Expanding the Number of L-Sequences
We now show that the table can be expanded without increasing the number of
queries M . The key idea is to exploit the multiplicative property of the Legendre
symbol.
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Lemma 1. Let m be a positive integer and k ∈ Fp. For any b ∈ F×p and a ∈ Fp
it holds that
Lk/b(a/b+ [m]) = (l(b), . . . , l(b))⊕ Lk(a+ b[m]).
Proof. Immediate by the multiplicative property of l.
Lemma 2. Let k ∈ Fp and m ≤M positive integers. Then from the arithmetic
L-sequence Lk([M ]), it is possible to extract ∼M2/m arithmetic L-sequences of
the form Lk/b(a/b+ [m]) for distinct pairs (a, b) ∈ Fp × F×p .
Proof. Let b a positive integer such that b ≤ bM/mc. By Lemma 1, we get
Lk(a+ b[m]) = (l(b), . . . , l(b))⊕ Lk/b(a/b+ [m])
for any a ∈ [0,M − bm + 1), thus each b yields a total of M − bm + 1 L-
sequences of length m. Moreover, since Lk(a − b[m]) is equal to the sequence
Lk(a−b(m−1)+b[m]) = Lk(a′+b[m]) written in reverse order, we can consider
negative values for b too, thus doubling the total number of sequences. Hence,
the total number of arithmetic L-sequences of length m that can be extracted
from Lk([M ]) equals
2
bM/mc∑
b=1
(M − bm+ 1) ∼ 2M
2
m
−m
M/m∑
b=1
b ∼ 2M
2
m
− M
2
m
=
M2
m
.uunionsq
3.3 An Improved Table-Based Collision Search
The observations from Section 3.2 will now be used to improve the table-based
collision search from Section 3.1.
As before, let M be the allowed number of queries to the oracle Lk, where
log pM < √p. Let m = dlog pe. The attack proceeds as follows:
1. Query the sequence Lk([M ]) and extract ∼ M2/m sequences of the form
Lk/b(a/b+ [m]) from it. This is possible by Lemma 2. Store all of the triples
(Lk/b(a/b+ [m]), a, b) in a table T .
2. Sample c uniformly at random from Fp until (L0(c+ [m]), a, b) ∈ T for some
a and b. For each pair (a, b) corresponding to such a collision, a candidate
key k˜ is recovered as k˜ = bc− a. By Assumption 1, the number of candidate
keys is at most O(1). As before, the correctness of candidate keys k˜ can
easily be verified.
The first step of the attack requires M queries to Lk and ∼ M/m Legendre
symbol evaluations. Storing the table T requires O(M2) memory. In the second
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phase, an average of ∼ mp/M2 samples must be tested before a collision is
found. Hence, the computational cost of this step is dominated by O(pm2/M2)
Legendre symbol evaluations.
It follows that the overall cost of the attack is dominated by the extraction of
O(M2/m) sequences, the evaluation of O(M/m+p log2 p/M2) Legendre symbols
and a memory requirement of O(M2). For M < √p, this is always an improve-
ment over the attack from Section 3.1 – possibly after discarding some of the
data.
3.4 Additional Optimizations
This section describes a number of additional optimizations that allow a further
reduction of both the time and the memory complexity of the attack by a factor
Ω(log p).
Using Consecutive Values of c The second step of the attack from Section 3.3
can be optimized by choosing consecutive values of c rather than uniform ran-
dom samples. This approach allows us to reuse most of the Legendre symbol
computations since, for example, L0(c + [m]) and L0(c + 1 + [m]) overlap al-
most completely. A priori, this allows reducing the number of Legendre symbol
computations by a factor of Ω(m). However, there is an important caveat: since
the guesses for c are not independent, the expected number of iterations of the
second step is no longer pm/M2. To see why this is the case, recall that for any
c, the algorithm will output the correct key k if there exists (∗, a, b) ∈ T such
that k = bc−a. Since the table contains an entry (∗, a, b) for all sufficiently small
values of a and b, it is clear that if the table contains (∗, a, b) such that k = bc−a
it is likely to also contain (∗, a′ = a+ b, b) such that k = b(c+ 1)−a′. Therefore,
if c is a good guess, then c+ 1 is also likely to be a good guess. Since the “good”
values of c are clustered together in groups of size O(m), we expect the required
number of iterations to be O(pm2/M2), which means that the factor Ω(m) that
we saved by using consecutive guesses for c is lost again. However, we can still
use this idea to reduce the memory complexity of the algorithm: by only stor-
ing one entry (∗, a, b) for each cluster of good c’s, i.e. we only store the triples
(∗, a, b) such that |a| < |b|, the size of the table can be reduced by a factor of
Ω(m) without impacting the time complexity of the attack.
Expanding the Number of L-Sequences in the Second Step The idea
outlined in Section 3.2 can be used to create new L-sequences from those com-
puted during the second step of the attack. Indeed, after computing a large
number of w = Ω(m) consecutive Legendre symbols L0(c+ [w]), it is possible to
extract Ω(w2/m2) arithmetic subsequences of the form L0(c + c
′ + d[m]) such
that |c′| < |d|, with no need to compute additional Legendre symbols. Using the
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property that
L0(c+ c
′ + d[m]) = L0((c+ c′)/d+ [m])⊕ L0(d)
we can then do Ω(w2/m2) table lookups. Asymptotically, this allows to amor-
tize away the cost of computing Legendre symbols, so the time complexity is
dominated by the extraction of O(pm2/M2) subsequences rather than by the
computation of O(pm2/M2) Legendre symbols.
Not Storing Reverse Sequences Since the sequence a+b[m] is just the reverse
of the sequence a + b(m − 1) − b[m], there is some redundancy in the lookup
table. Indeed, for each entry (s, a, b) ∈ T , the reverse sequence corresponding to
the entry (s′, a+ b(m−1),−b) is also stored. If, instead, we only store either the
sequence or its reverse (e.g. by storing the lexicographically smallest sequence),
then the memory requirements are reduced by a factor of two without affecting
the overall time-complexity just by looking up either the sequence L0(c + [m])
or its reverse in T , depending which comes first lexicographically.
4 Application to the Higher-Degree Legendre PRF
In this section we generalize the attack described in Section 3 to Legendre PRFs
of degree d > 1. In Section 4.1 it is shown how to expand the number of L-
sequences in the higher-degree setting. The resulting attack is detailed in Sec-
tion 4.2.
4.1 Expanding the Number of L-Sequences
In order to generalize Lemma 2, we need to extend Lemma 1 to the higher-degree
case. This is the object of Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. For any positive integer m, b ∈ F×p and a ∈ Fp, there exists an
invertible affine transformation Ta,b such that for any k ∈ Fdp,
LTa,b(k)([m]) = (l(b
d), . . . , l(bd))⊕ Lk(a+ b[m]).
Moreover, for any choice of (a, b) ∈ Fp × F×p , the transformation Ta,b can be
efficiently computed.
Proof. Lef f be the monic degree d polynomial with coefficient vector k, and let
Ta,b(k) be the coefficient vector of the monic polynomial f(a+ bx)/b
d. Then, by
the multiplicative property of the Legendre symbol, we have that
LTa,b(k)([m]) = (l(b
d), . . . , l(bd))⊕ Lk(a+ b[m]).
Furthermore, it is not hard to see that Ta,b is invertible, affine and that it can
be computed efficiently.
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Lemma 4. Let k ∈ Fdp and m ≤M positive integers. Then from the arithmetic
L-sequence Lk([M ]), it is possible to extract ∼ M2/m arithmetic L-sequences
of the form Lk′([m]) with k
′ as defined in Lemma 3 for distinct pairs (a, b) ∈
Fp × F×p .
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma 2.
4.2 An Improved Table-Based Collision Search
The attack proceeds in essentially the same way as described in Section 3.3 for
the linear case. Let M be the allowed number of consecutive queries to the oracle
Lk. Let m = d dlog pe. The attack comprises the following steps:
1. Query the sequence Lk([M ]) and extract ∼ M2/m sequences of the form
Lk′([m]) from it. This is possible by Lemma 4. Store all of the triples
(Lk′([m]), a, b) in a table T .
2. Sample k′ uniformly at random from Fdp until (Lk′([m]), a, b) ∈ T for some
a and b. For each pair (a, b) corresponding to such a collision, a candidate
key k˜ can be recovered from k, a and b as in Lemma 3. By Assumption 1,
the number of candidate keys is at most O(1). As before, the correctness of
candidate keys can easily be verified.
As in Section 3.3, the computational cost of the first step is dominated by the ex-
traction of O(M2/m) sequences. For the second step, at most O(pdm2/M2) Leg-
endre symbols are expected to be evaluated. Hence, the total computational cost
of the attack consists of O(M2/m) sequence extractions and O(pd d2 log2 p/M2)
Legendre symbol evaluations. The attack requires O(M2) memory.
For d ≥ 3, the time-complexity is minimized for M = p. The time complexity is
then O(pd−2d2 log2 p) Legendre symbol computations. Hence, we gain a factor
of p in time relative to the attacks by Khovratovich [Kho19].
5 Weak Keys in the Higher-Degree Legendre PRF
In this section, we exhibit a large class of weak keys for the higher-degree Leg-
endre PRF. Our attacks are based on the observation that for some keys, the
corresponding monic polynomial factors as a product of polynomials of lower
degree.
5.1 A Birthday-Bound Attack for Some Keys
Consider the Legendre PRF of degree d ≥ 2 over Fp for a prime p. Recall
that the key k ∈ Fdp of the PRF corresponds to the monic polynomial f(x) =
12
xd+
∑d−1
i=0 ki+1x
i ∈ Fp[x]. The attack in this section is based on the observation
that, with high probability, the polynomial f has a factor of degree t = bd/2c.
In this case, there exist two monic polynomials g, h ∈ Fp[x] with deg g = t and
deg h = d− t such that f = gh.
Assume that we are given the outputs of the PRF on m = ddlog pe arbitrary
inputs, for example the sequence Lk([m]). Then, by the multiplicative property
of the Legendre symbol4,
Lk([m]) = l(g([m]))⊕ l(h([m])).
Hence, the problem of finding the secret key k ∈ Fdp reduces to a simple collision
search:
1. Query the sequence Lk([m]) from the PRF. For each monic polynomial g of
degree t, store the pair (Lk([m])⊕ l(g([m])), g) in a table T .
2. Sample monic polynomials h of degree d− t until (l(f([m])), g) ∈ T for some
monic polynomial g of degree t. For each such g, recover a candidate key
from the coefficients of gh. By Assumption 1, the number of candidate keys
will be at most O(1).
For t = dd/2e, this attack requires O(pdd/2ed log p) memory and its time com-
plexity is dominated by O(pbd/2cd log p) Legendre symbol computations. The
attack requires only m = O(d log p) queries to the PRF.
Using Van Oorschot-Wiener golden collision search [vOW94], an improved time-
memory trade-off can be obtained: given M bits of memory, the key can be
recovered with a time-complexity of O(d log p
√
p3d/2/M) Legendre symbol eval-
uations.
Even if the polynomial f does not have a factor of degree exactly dd/2e, it might
still have a factor of large degree t < dd/2e. In this case, the same strategy
results in an attack with time complexity O(pd−td log p) and memory complexity
O(ptd log p). This gives a trade-off between more efficient attacks on a smaller
fraction of keys (when t is large) or less efficient attacks on a larger fraction of the
keys (when t is small). This trade-off is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure shows
the time-complexity of the attack for a desired fraction of attackable keys. The
construction of Figure 1 is based on the following fact [Tao15]: the fraction of
monic degree-d polynomials whose factorization has exactly ci monic irreducible
factors of degree i is 1/
∏d
i=1 ci! i
ci as p → ∞. By summing these probabilities
over all integer partitions of d that allow a (t, d−t) split, we obtain the probability
that a uniformly random key is weak.
We conclude that if the key is chosen uniformly at random, the higher-degree
Legendre PRF has security only up to the birthday bound. To completely prevent
this class of attacks, one can choose the key k such that the corresponding
polynomial f is irreducible.
4 For convenience, we extend our notation for arithmetic L-sequences (Definition 3)
to arbitrary functions on Fp. In particular, l(g([m])) = (l(g(0)), . . . , l(g(m− 1))).
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Fig. 1. The complexity of the attack, measured as a power of p, as a function of the
degree of f and the desired fraction of keys we want to attack.
5.2 Reduction to the Unique k-XOR Problem
More generally, the secret polynomial could factor into k polynomials of degree
roughly d/k. For example, if d is divisible by k and f =
∏k
i=1 fi with deg fi =
d/k, we have
Lk([m]) =
k⊕
i=1
l(fi([m])).
That is, it suffices to find a solution to a variant of the k-XOR problem. Specif-
ically, since each list has length pd/k, a unique solution is expected. This makes
Wagner’s approach [Wag02] inapplicable, but some improvements over the at-
tack in Section 5.1 are nevertheless possible.
In particular, for k = 4, the algorithm of Chose, Joux and Mitton [CJM02]
leads to a time complexity O˜(pd/2) with only O˜(pd/4) memory. Corresponding
time-memory trade-offs can also be obtained.
Finally, we mention that there exist asymptotically better quantum algorithms
for the unique k-XOR problem. Bernstein et al. [BJLM13] give an O˜(p0.3d) al-
gorithm requiring O˜(p0.2n) quantum-accessible quantum memory for k = 4. For
any k ≥ 3, Naya-Plasencia and Schrottenloher [NPS19] give algorithms running
in time O˜(pβkd) where βk = (k+dk/5e)/(4k) using O˜(p0.2n) quantum-accessible
quantum memory. For k = 3, there is an algorithm using O˜(pd/3) time and
O˜(pd/3) quantum-accessible classical memory.
6 Jacobi Symbol PRF
The Jacobi pseudorandom generator was proposed by Damg˚ard [Dam90] as a
variation on the Legendre PRG. As discussed by Damg˚ard [Dam90, §5], it is po-
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tentially more efficient because it can be computed as the exclusive-or of several
Legendre PRGs with a relatively small modulus. In addition, Damg˚ard showed
that if the Legendre generator is weakly unpredictable, then the Jacobi genera-
tor is strongly unpredictable. A generator is defined to be weakly unpredictable
if, for all polynomials f , there exist only finitely many integers m ≥ 0 such that
the next output bit in a sequence of length m can be predicted with probability
greater than 1 − 1/f(m). Similarly, the generator is said to be strongly unpre-
dictable if the probability of successful prediction exceeds 1/2 + 1/f(m) for only
finitely many m. For a more formal definition, see [Dam90, §3] and references
therein.
This section investigates the security of the Jacobi PRF in the chosen-plaintext
setting. Whereas the unpredictability result of Damg˚ard could be regarded as a
positive result related to the security of the Jacobi PRF, it remains inconclu-
sive concerning its concrete security. Indeed, strong unpredictability is a weaker
property than PRF-security and, in addition, it is only an asymptotic notion of
security.
Clearly, the cost of attacking the Jacobi PRF is at least the cost of attacking a
Legendre PRF corresponding to a prime factor of the modulus. Below, a chosen-
plaintext key-recovery attack on the Jacobi PRF is given which nearly attains
this lower bound. Hence, for most purposes, the Jacobi PRF offers little benefit
over the Legendre PRF.
Let n =
∏m
i=1 pi with p1, . . . , pm distinct odd primes. Note that it may be as-
sumed that the prime factors of n are distinct, since
(
x+ k
n
)
=
(
x+ k∏m
i=1 p
ei
i
)
=
m∏
i=1
ei odd
(
x+ k
pi
)
.
Let λj =
∏m
i=1
i 6=j
pi and denote the inverse of λj modulo pj by λ
′
j . Then
(
λj x+ k
n
)
=
m∏
i=1
(
λj x+ k
pi
)
=
(
λj
pj
)(
k
n/pj
)(
x+ λ′j k
pj
)
.
Hence, in the chosen-plaintext setting, the key-recovery attack on the Legen-
dre PRF from Section 3 can be used to recover the key modulo pj . The factor(
k
n/pj
)
is not known to the attacker, but it is constant so the cost of the at-
tack is increased by a factor of at most two. Given the value of the key mod-
ulo each prime factor of n, the Chinese remainder theorem yields the value of
the key modulo n. Hence, key recovery for the Jacobi symbol costs at most
O(mM2 +∑mi=1 pi log2 pi/M2) Legendre symbol evaluations. The same strategy
is applicable to the higher-degree case and can also be combined with the attacks
in Section 7 below.
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7 Attacks on the Power Residue PRF
The MPC protocol of Grassi et al. [GRR+16] for computing the Legendre PRF
requires only three rounds of communication, which makes the Legendre PRF
superior among the PRF constructions investigated by Grassi et al. in terms of
latency. However, since the Legendre PRF only produces one bit of output, it
compares less favorably in terms of throughput than e.g. MiMC [AGR+16], a
block cipher that outputs full field elements.
To mitigate this limitation of the Legendre PRF we can, as proposed by Damg˚ard
[Dam90], consider higher power residue symbols rather than quadratic residue
symbols. If r divides p− 1, the r-th power residue symbol of x ∈ Fp is defined as(
x
p
)
r
:= x
p−1
r mod p.
Jointly computing r-th power residue symbols in the MPC setting can be done
at essentially the same cost as computing Legendre symbols with the advantage
that log r bit outputs are produced instead. Therefore, this modification has
the potential to significantly increase the throughput of the Legendre PRF at
essentially no cost – keeping in mind that r should not be too large, since the
corresponding power residue PRF might lose its security (e.g. r = p− 1). In this
section we provide the first security analysis of the power residue PRF. We show
that there exists an attack with time complexity O(p log2 p/(Mr log2 r)), given
M ≤ √p queries to the PRF.
7.1 Power Residue PRF
By generalising the Legendre function and the Legendre PRF to higher power
residues, we obtain the following definitions:
Definition 4 (r-th power residue function). Let p be a prime congruent to
1 mod r and g a generator of F×p . Then we define the r-th power residue function
l(r) : Fp → Zr as
l(r)(a) =
{
k if a 6≡ 0 mod p and a/gk is an r-th power mod p
0 if a ≡ 0 mod p
Definition 5 (r-th power residue PRF). Let p be a prime congruent to 1
modulo r. The power residue PRF over Fp is a family of functions L(r)k : Fp → Zr
such that for each k ∈ Fp,
L
(r)
k (x) = l
(r)(k + x).
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7.2 Generalising our Attack to the Power Residue PRF
The attacks described in Section 3 and Section 4 do not use any properties of
the Legendre symbol other than its multiplicativity. Therefore, they trivially
generalize to any multiplicative function with a hidden shift, including the r-th
power residue function.
Unlike the quadratic case, the r-th power residue function can take r distinct
values, so it suffices to consider L-sequences of length log p/ log r. It follows
that a straightforward generalization of our attack to r-th power residue Leg-
endre PRFs requires O(p log2 p/(M2 log2 r)) power residue symbol evaluations
and O(M2 log r) memory. However, for large values of r, there exists a better
attack which is detailed in the next section.
7.3 Attacks for Large r
We first describe a very simple attack on the linear r-th power residue Legendre
PRF that requires O(p/r) power residue symbol evaluations. In the following,
denote the subgroup of (p− 1)/r-th roots of unity of F×p by G. That is,
G = {x ∈ F×p | x(p−1)/r = 1}.
Remark that G is generated by gr, where g is any generator of F×p .
By querying L
(r)
k (0), the attacker immediately learns l
(r)(k), the power residue
symbol of k ∈ Fp. We observe that this single query already narrows down
the set of possible values for k to at most (p − 1)/r elements of Fp. Indeed,
from Definition 4, k is contained in the coset gsG, where g is any generator of
F×p and s is equal to l(r)(k). Therefore, an attacker can just go through all of
these elements and check each candidate. Since, on average, only O(1) power
residue symbols must be computed to check the validity of a candidate key, the
attack requires O(p/r) power residue symbols evaluations. The attack requires
a generator g, which can be precomputed in probabilistic subexponential time
by factoring p− 1.
We now explain a more general attack that requires O(p log2 p/(Mr log2 r))
power residue symbol evaluations and O(M log r) memory. The attack is similar
to the table-based collision search from Section 3.1. A speed-up of a factor r is
obtained by querying the PRF at more carefully chosen arithmetic L-sequences.
Let m = dlog p/ log re and M < p/r. The attack proceeds as follows:
1. For M/m distinct values a ∈ G, store each pair (L(r)k (a[m]), a) in a table T .
Furthermore, query the PRF to get the value s = L
(r)
k (0).
2. Sample x uniformly at random from the coset gsG until (L(r)0 (x+[m]), a) ∈ T
for some value a. For each entry (L
(r)
0 (x + [m]), a) ∈ T corresponding to
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such a collision, a candidate key is recovered as k˜ = xa. By a variant of
Assumption 1, the number of such candidate keys will be at most O(1).
The first step of the above attack uses M = m ·(M/m) queries to L(r)k and needs
O(M log r) memory to store the table T . The key k is found when, in the second
step, the attacker samples an x such that k/x is one of the a-values stored in
the table. On average, |G|/(M/m) = O(pm/(Mr)) iterations of the second step
are required in order to find a candidate key. Since each iteration requires m
power residue symbol computations to evaluate L
(r)
0 (x + [m]), it follows that
the total time-complexity of the attack consists of O(M) storage operations and
O(pm2/(Mr)) = O(p log2 p/(Mr log2 r)) power residue symbol evaluations.
8 Implementation Results
This section discusses several aspects of our implementation of the attack from
Section 3.3 that we applied to the key recovery puzzles proposed by the Ethereum
foundation [Fei19b]. Using the attack from Section 3, we managed to solve three
out of six challenges (including the test instance with a 40-bit prime). A summary
of the instance parameters and the time and memory requirements of the attack
is given in Table 2.
The source code of our implementation is publicly available at
https://github.com/cryptolu/LegendrePRF
Table 2. Parameters of the concrete challenges proposed by the Ethereum founda-
tion [Fei19b]. For all instances, the first M = 220 consecutive PRF outputs were given.
For the first three instances, the running time and peak memory usage is given, for the
three hardest instances an estimation of time is provided (marked by †). All experi-
ments were performed on a Dell C6420 server with two Intel Xeon Gold 6132 CPUs
clocked at 2.6 GHz and 128 GB of RAM.
p
Security level5
(bits)
Time
(CPU-hours)
Memory / thread
(GB)
Key
240 − 87 20 ¡ 0.001 ¡ 1 4e2dea1f3c
264 − 59 44 1.5 3 90644c931a3fba5
274 − 35 54 1500 3 384f17db02976dcf63d
284 − 35 64 221† 3
2100 − 15 80 237† 3
2148 − 167 128 265† 3
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We compiled our C++ implementation of the attack using Clang 6.0.0 and ex-
ecuted it on a Dell C6420 server with two Intel Xeon Gold 6132 CPUs clocked
at 2.6 GHz (28 cores) and 128 GB of RAM. The optimizations described in Sec-
tion 3.4 allow to significantly reduce the required memory and the number of
evaluations of the Legendre symbol. As a result, the table lookups are the bot-
tleneck in our implementation. On average, a single thread required 0.08µs to
compute and check a single 64-bit sequence. As discussed below, we expect to
compute p/228 sequences on average before the key is recovered. Hence, the re-
quired CPU time to solve a challenge with a prime p and 220 bits of PRF output
can be estimated as p/228 × 0.08µs. The required memory is 1 GB per server
and an additional 3 GB per thread. The parameters can be modified to reduce
the memory without significantly decreasing the performance.
For the first three instances we successfully recovered the secret key of the PRF in
a timespan close to our estimation. The corresponding keys are given in Table 2.
The third instance was solved in under two hours using a cluster of 40 nodes
with the described configuration. Further details about the main steps of the
attack are provided below.
Step 1: Processing the PRF Output As a first step we compute the set
T consisting of all arithmetic sequences extracted from the sequence Lk([220])
given in the challenge. We chose to store sequences of length m = 64 since this
length provides an acceptable rate of false-positives and enables to efficiently
process sequences as 64-bit words. As a result, the set T contains approximately
M2/(2m2) = 227 of such words-sequences.
A straightforward way to implement a set is by using a hash table, which has
a constant amortized time-complexity for membership testing. However, this
constant time may be quite large in practice, especially in the case of large
tables. Random memory accesses are often the main bottleneck. In our case,
the set T is never modified after its creation. To exploit this fact, we sort the
elements of T and we store them in an array. Then, we compute membership
queries in batches. First, we collect a large amount of membership queries and we
sort them. Then, we scan through the two sorted arrays checking for collisions.
The bottleneck in this approach is represented by the sorting step of each batch
of membership queries. The described set T contains 227 64-bit words and the
corresponding sorted array requires 1 GB of memory. An extra 1 GB of memory
is used to store information required for the key recovery. Note that the set T and
the extra information are shared among all threads that are used to parallelize
the workload of the next step.
Step 2: Random Sampling The second and main step of the attack consists
of sampling sequences L0(c + [m]) for randomly chosen c and checking if they
5 Expected security level (conservative estimate) prior to this work.
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collide with an entry of T . Note that the reversed sequence L0(c+[m]) is checked
if it is lexicographically smaller.
For a uniformly chosen c ∈ Fp we compute a long sequence L0(c + [t]) and
we extract a large amount of m-bit sequences from it. More precisely, for all
b ∈ (1 + [28]) and a ∈ [t − b(m − 1)], we extract L0(c + a + b[m]). The upper-
bound for b is chosen as 28 since it is enough to make the time spent on computing
Legendre symbols negligible. Furthermore, all these sequences can be computed
on the fly by storing only the last sequence per pair (b, a). Indeed, for a large
enough i ∈ Z, after expanding the computed sequence L0(c + [i − 1]) by one
Legendre symbol L0(c+ i) we obtain a new sequence L0(c+ i− b(m− 1) + b[m])
for each b. In other words, we obtain 28 sequences from each single consequent
Legendre symbol computation.
As described above, the computed sequences are accumulated and checked in
batches for a collision with the set T . Each batch is sorted using base-28 radix
sort and collisions are checked using a linear scan through the sorted batch and
the sorted array of T . In the case of a collision, a key candidate is recovered and
checked against extra bits from the given PRF output.
Note that this step can be efficiently parallelized. Each thread starts with a uni-
formly random a ∈ Fp and proceeds as described above. After a predetermined
amount of steps, a new value for a can be chosen to ensure a sufficiently uniform
coverage of the possible offsets of the sequences.
9 Conclusions
In Section 3, a new attack on the Legendre PRF was presented. It is of particular
interest in the low-data setting. Specifically, given M ≤ 4√p queries, our attack
recovers the key using O(p log2 p/M2) Legendre symbol evaluations. The prac-
tical relevance of this result was demonstrated by solving the first two Legendre
PRF challenges set out by the Ethereum foundation [Fei19b]. Several aspects of
our implementation of the attack were discussed in Section 8.
In Section 4, it was shown how the technique from Section 3 yields improved at-
tacks on the higher-degree generalization of the Legendre PRF. Further attacks
on the higher-degree case were given in Section 5, where a large class of weak keys
was revealed. Keys from this class can be recovered using O(pbd/2cd log p) Leg-
endre symbol evaluations and O(pdd/2ed log p) memory. Further improvements
to the memory usage, based on a reduction to the unique k-XOR problem, were
also discussed. These weak key attacks can be prevented by choosing the key
such that the corresponding monic polynomial is irreducible.
In addition to the above, we provided the first security analysis of the Jacobi
and power-residue generalizations of the Legendre PRF. These extensions were
first suggested – for the Legendre pseudorandom generator – at CRYPTO 1988
by Damg˚ard [Dam90]. It was demonstrated in Section 6 that the key of a Jacobi
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PRF can be recovered with time-complexity proportional to the time-complexity
of key-recovery on the Legendre PRF for each of the prime factors of the modu-
lus separately. This result eliminates the potential efficiency benefits offered by
Jacobi symbols.
Power residue symbols were considered in Section 7. The low-data attack from
Section 3 equally applies in this setting, but we provide an additional attack
that preforms better for large power residue symbols. Specifically, for r-th power
residue symbols and given M ≤ √p queries, our key-recovery attack requires
O(p log2 p/(rM log2 r)) power residue evaluations and O(M) memory.
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